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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Communications-FCC JURISDICTION-TELEVISION INTERFERENCE
CAUSED BY CONSTRUCTION OF TALL BUILDINGS IN URBAN AREAS
Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC,
467 F.2d 1397 (7th Cir. 1972)
Television signals are electromagnetic waves which can be
reflected or blocked, much like light waves.' In urban areas, transmis-
sion towers normally are located to avoid the possibility of such
interference. 2 They generally are placed on top of the tallest building
in the area or on a hill, thereby extending the tower beyond the height
of the area's tallest structure. The recent revival of vertical construc-
tion in major cities3 has caused interference with pre-existing tower
transmission facilities, 4 and this trend threatens to cause significant
In urban areas tall buildings cause two types of broadcast interference
problems---"shadowing" and "ghosting." "Shadowing" is the interference caused by a blockage
of the signal. If the interfering structure blocks the television signal, a "snowy" picture will result
on the receiver.
[T]he net effect [of blockage] would be to measurably reduce the energy available to
provide service.... This reduction in energy would be evidenced by a corresponding
reduction in the quality of the picture, and in many cases the presence of 'snow.'
Committee for a Reasonable World Trade Center, Press Release, May 19, 1967 (on file at the
Cornell Law Review).
"Ghosting" is the interference phenomenon caused by reflection of the television signal
resulting in multiple images appearing on the receiver. The intensity of the problem will vary as
the ghosting signals become diffuse. See Statement of Frank Gregg Kear Before the Board of
Estimate, Exhibit II, June 16, 1967 (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
2 The Federal Communications Commission [hereinafter FCC] directs that the transmis-
sion facilities of its licensees be located at the highest point possible to avoid existing structures
or topographical features which might interfere with the broadcast signal.
Location of the antenna at a point of high elevation is necessary to reduce to a
minimum the shadow effect on propogation due to hills and buildings which may
reduce materially the intensity of the station's signals. In general, the transmitting
antenna of a station should be located at the most central point at the highest elevation
available.... The location should be so chosen that line-of-sight can be obtained from
the antenna over the principal community to be served; in no event should there be a
major obstruction in this path.
47 C.F.R. § 73.685(b) (1972).
3 High-rise construction is underway in most of America's major urban areas including
Boston, San Francisco, Atlanta, and Dallas. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 20, 1972, at
112. According to Ada Louise Huxtable, architecture critic for the New York Times, the "race is
on again.., for the world's tallest building." Huxtable, What's Higher Than Highest? Wait and See,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1972, § 2, at 23, col. 1. See also, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1972, at 103 (notes
"skyscraper boom" taking place in American cities).
4 The problem of interference has been most publicized in the cases involving the con-
struction of the World Trade Center in New York in 1967 and the recent construction of the
158
RECENT DEVELOPMENT
broadcasting problems in the future. The present state of technology
makes 150 story buildings a distinct possibility, 5 and pressing needs to
conserve urban land make such buildings socially' attractive. 6 Al-
though there is some controversy over the efficacy of skyscraper
construction, it is safe to assume that such factors as civic pride7 and
economics 8 will encourage more such construction in the future.
Sears Tower in Chicago. In both cases groups of viewers whose television reception was
impaired by interference formed organizations to seek relief. Both groups sought to limit the
construction of the buildings to heights below that which would interfere with television signals.
Both were unsuccessful in their attempts. See notes 18 & 9-24 and accompanying textinfra. The
Committee for a Reasonable World Trade Center, organized by the New York viewers, sought
to persuade the city council to limit the height of the Trade Center to 900 feet, a height which
would not present the serious interference problems the viewers feared. The Committee took
out full page advertisements in the New York Times designed to gain relief by bringing pressure
to bear on the council and also on Governor Rockefeller. See N.Y. Times, May 9, 1968, at 37.
In Chicago, the Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting [hereinafter Committee] was
formed in an effort to protect Chicago metropolitan viewers. The Committee's attempts to force
the FCC to assumejurisdiction over the construction failed before both the FCC and the courts.
Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 35 F.C.C.2d 237 (1972);
Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 467 F.2d 1397 (7th Cir. 1972).
5 Fazlur Kahn, the structural engineer responsible for developing the "trussed-tube super-
frame" approach to skyscraper construction employed in both the 100-story John Hancock
Building and the 110-story Sears Tower in Chicago, believes that 150-story buildings can be
built employing the "trussed-tube superframe" concept. Kahn, The Future of Highrise Structure,
PROGRESSIVE ARCHITECTURE, Oct. 1972, at 78. For an explanation of the mechanics of the
"trussed-tube superframe" concept, which is also referred to as the "bundled tube" approach,
see Fisher, Optimizing the Structure of the Skyscraper, ARCHITECTURAL RECORD, Oct. 1972, at 97.
Other experts contend that there are no structural limits to the potential height of build-
ings. According to L. E. Robertson, partner in a New York architectural firm, "We could start
erecting a mile-high structure next year." U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 20, 1972, at 112.
6 Other problems, more serious than television interference, tend to diminish the social
attractiveness of skyscraper construction. Serious problems of waste disposal, transportation,
and provision of services such as heat and electricity are created by such construction. Also,
serious questions of safety, particularly fire. protection and rescue problems, have yet to be
adequately answered by the proponents of skyscrapers. It is doubtful that these problems will
deter skyscraper construction, however, since the economic benefits from tower construction
appear to be the major impetus behind the recent trend.
Though architects and planners offer a variety of defenses on behalf of their
super-skyscrapers, the fundamental consideration is money. Wayne S. Doran, presi-
dent of the Ford Motor Land Development Corp., puts it this way: "The greatest plus
of the skyscraper in highly concentrated cities is economic. To build a low-rise
1,500-room hotel would not only be prohibitive in cost; it would also be operationally
chaotic. It is also, of course, much less expensive to move both people and heat up and
down rather than over a broad, low-rise area."
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1972, at 103.
7 The motive of civic pride was dearly in evidence in the New York City Council's decision
to permit construction of the World Trade Center to a height of 110 stories and 1,350 feet. One
of the major reasons advanced by Percy Sutton, President of the Borough of Manhattan, for his
vote approving the Trade Center as planned was his "desire ... to project always, New York as
'the town of the tallest.' " Statement of Percy E. Sutton on Vote on the World Trade Issue,June
22, 1967 (emphasis in original) (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
The desire for urban areas to demonstrate their social and economic vitality in answer to
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I
Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC
In Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC' (ICCB), a
group of television viewers1" sought to force the FCC to assume
jurisdiction over the construction of the Sears Tower in Chicago. The
plaintiffs were attempting to prevent the inevitable interference with
television reception" which would result from the completion of the
skyscraper.' 2 The Commission had previously declined to assume
jurisdiction on the ground that its authority was limited by statute' 3 to
control over signal-generating or transmission facilities.1 4 Since the
assertions that cities in general are rapidly decaying also contributes to the civic pride element.
New York City Council President Frank D. O'Connor enunciated this desire in voicing his
support for the World Trade Center.
I am personally and firmly committed to a new and better role in foreign trade for
New York City, and the World Trade Center must hopefully serve that end not only as
a remarkable geographic and economic edifice, but as a landmark of a revitalized New
York.
Statement of Frank D. O'Connor Regarding the World Trade Center, June 22, 1967 (on file at
the Cornell Law Review).
8 See note 6 supra.
9 467 F.2d 1397 (7th Cir. 1972).
10 The suit was brought as a class action "on behalf of the petitioners, all television viewers
in the Chicago area, future Chicago broadcast licensees, and nine television stations." Id. at
1398.11 Petitioners were requesting the FCC to take all necessary steps to prevent the interfer-
ence, "including, if necessary, an order directing Sears to'cease and desist from the construction
of Sears Tower as presently designed until it has taken all actions necessary to protect the rights
of complainants and those they represent to an adequate signal.' "Id.
12 Ghosting is the most serious of the interference problems faced by the Chicago met-
ropolitan area viewers. The signals reradiated by the Sears Tower have been estimated to cause
ghosting of 8% or more in as many as 179,000 households in the densely populated area of
northwest Chicago. Second Report on Sears Building Study, Analysis of Material Furnished by
Sears, Roebuck & Co. and by A. Earl Cullum, Jr., June 21, 1972, Attachment 2 (on file at the
CornellLaw Review). As many as 38, 100 households located east of the building are also affected.
Id. All ten Chicago television stations would be affected by the interference, with the UHF
stations suffering the greatest percentage of ghosting. Channel 44, for example, would suffer a
ghosting percentage of 96.6% in its signal directed to the north.ld. This is to be compared with
an 8% base figure of ghosting at which the interference becomes perceptible.Id. at 5. The lowest
level of interference would be 13.5% for Channel 9 on its signal to the east. Id. at Attachment 2.
The average level of interference is 45.1% ghosting for signals transmitted to the north and
25.8% ghosting for signals transmitted to the east. Id.
13 The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Communications Act].
14 The ICCB cites no express provisions of the Act, nor to any Congressional
intent to give this agency authority over any structure which may impact upon
signal reception, if the building is not intended as a signal generating or
producing structure.
Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 35 F.C.C.2d 237,
237 (1972).
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Sears Tower was not a signal-emitting facility within the meaning of
the Communications Act, 15 no FCCjurisdiction was found to exist. 16
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the FCC
determination 17 and implied that jurisdiction over such matters
should be left to local authorities.' 8
The appellants inICCB were unable to cite any express language
15 Section 302(a) of the Act provides that the Commission may, consistent
with the public interest, convenience and necessity, make reasonable regula-
tions governing interference potential of devices which are capable in their
operation of emitting radio frequency energy by radiation, conduction or
other means in sufficient degree to cause harmful interference to radio
communications. That the Sears Tower is not such a device, or signal-
generating equipment, or some other signal-producing facility is clear and we
have been referred to no authority which would support such an interpreta-
tion.
Id. at 238.
1" The Ccmmission shares the concern of ICCB, for the problem is not
confined to Chicago .alone. It is a fact of our modem existence, and similar
problems are likely to arise. It is hoped that as the state of the art progresses,
technological advances will provide alternatives to eliminate the problem or
will minimize their impact. However, in the absence of statutory authority, this
Commission has no jurisdiction over the Sears Tower or similar structures.
Id. at 239.
'7 [The Commission's] authority is limited to situations in which the interfer-
ence is created by, to use the Commission's words, "a signal-generating" or
"signal-producing" facility. Sections 152 and 153 refer only to transmission
facilities. Section 302(a) authorizes the FCC to make reasonable regulations
governing the "interference potential of devices which are capable in their
operations of emitting radio frequency energy by radiation, conduction, or
other means in sufficient degree to cause harmful interference to radio
communications." Since the construction of the Sears Tower fits within none
of these categories, we agree with the FCC's finding that it lacks jurisdiction
to regulate.
467 F.2d at 1401.
18 "Indeed to so find where building construction is concerned would be to
enmesh the FCC in a variety of local considerations and an often complex local
regulatory scheme." Id. at 1400.
In the earlier controversy involving the World Trade Center in New York,
hearings were held by the FCC, upon congressional request, to determine the impact
of the building on television reception in the New York metropolitan area. Investiga-
tion of Television Interference To Be Caused by the Construction of the World Trade
Center by the Port of New York Authority, 10 P. & F. RADIO REG. 2D 1769 (1967).
The FCC Commissioner presiding over the hearings noted that the FCC had no
authority "to regulate in any way the construction of buildings . . . and that this
matter is presently strictly one of local concern and regulation." Id. at 1770. This
remark, however, was an expression of the Commissioner's personal opinion. There-
fore, it does not constitute FCC precedent. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v.
FCC, 467 F.2d 1397, 1400 n.10 (7th Cir. 1972).
The FCC order for a public hearing on the interference effects of the World
Trade Center emphasized the desire of the FCC to avoid becoming involved in local
construction. "[T]he construction of the structure is a matter of local control and . . .
we have no jurisdiction to take any action with regard thereto." Investigation of
Television Interference To Be Caused by the Construction of the World Trade Center
by the Port of New York Authority, 8 F.C.C.2d 327 (1967) (emphasis added).
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in the Communications Act to support their contention that the FCC
should assume jurisdiction over construction of interference-
producing buildings.'9 Relying principally upon United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co.,2 0 the appellants contended that the Communi-
cations Act applied "not only to 'persons engaged in communications
or transmission' and 'radio stations' but also 'the communications in
themselves.' ",21 Because the communications themselves were within
FCC jurisdiction, it was argued that all activities which "substantially
affect communications" should also be within FCCjurisdiction. 22 The
court rejected this interpretation of Southwestern Cable as "far too
broad" a reading and one which would result in expanding the FCC's
already substantial responsibilities.23
The court also rejected any analogy between the powers of the
Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) to exercise control over building
heights when such buildings might interfere with air navigation and
the power of the FCC to exercise jurisdiction over building heights to
protect television signals. 4
II
THE INADEQUACY OF PRESENT REMEDIES
A. FCC Jurisdiction
Congress, in establishing the Federal Communications Com-
mission,25 conferred "broad authority" on the agency in its regula-
19 467 F.2d at 1399.
20 392 U.S. 157 (1968). In Southwestern Cable, the Supreme Court upheld an FCC
determination that it had jurisdiction over community antenna television (CATV). Prior
to this time the FCC had declined jurisdiction over CATV because it was neither a
broadcaster nor a common carrier within the meaning of these terms in the
Communications Act. CATV & TV Reporter Serv., 26 F.C.C. 403, 427-28 (1959). The
Court in Southwestern Cable held that the FCC had jurisdiction over CATV since §
152(a) of the Communications Act (47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1970)) conferred an indepen-
dent grant of authority over "all interstate .. . communications by wire or radio." 392
U.S. at 173.
21 467 F.2d at 1399.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1400. In holding that there was no justification for extending FCC
jurisdiction to the degree sought by appellants, the court preferred to rely on the
following qualifications expressed by the Supreme Court in Southwestern Cable:
[T]he authority which we recognize today under § 152(a) is restricted to that
reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various
responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting. . . . We express
no views as to the Commission's authority, if any, to regulate CATV under
any other circumstances or for any other purposes.
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
24 467 F.2d at 1401.
25 The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970). Although the
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tory role over broadcasting.2 6 This authority has been interpreted as
granting the Commission "a comprehensive mandate" with "expan-
sive powers" 27 to meet the needs of a dynamic and complex
industry.28 The Commission's jurisdiction has not been limited to
those activities specifically mentioned in the statute, but has been
allowed to respond to technical advances and new problems 9 in
order to make "available... to all people of the United States a rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide . . . radio communication service." 30 The
Commission, however, has felt bound by the requirement in the Act
that its activities be limited to "communications by wire and radio."'"
Act speaks only in terms of "wire and radio communications," (id.) television has
consistently been held to be within the term "radio." See, e.g., Allen B. DuMont
Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951).
26 H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
The report of the interdepartmental committee on communications and
the hearings before both the House and Senate committees have shown the
great need for the creation of one central body vested with comprehensive
jurisdiction over the industry. In line with the President's message, it is the
primary purpose of this bill to create such a commission armed with adequate
statutory powers to regulate all forms of communication and to consider
needed additional legislation.
Id. at 3.
27 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943).
28 Congress in passing the Communications Act of 1934 could not . . .
anticipate the variety and nature of methods of communication by wire or
radio that would come into existence. . . . In such a situation, the expert
agency entrusted with administration of a dynamic industry is entitled to
latitude in coping with new developments in that industry.
Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 359 F.2d 282, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
The Commission must be given the "capacity to respond to change." General Tel.
Co. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); United States v. Storer Broadcasting, 351 U.S. 192
(1956); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcast Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940); Buckeye Cablevision, Inc.
v. FCC, 387 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
29 The most recent expansion of FCC jurisdiction has been in the field of cable
television. Although the Communications Act gave the Commission regulatory authority
over common carriers (e.g., telephone companies) (47 U.S.C. §§ 201-22 (1970)) and
broadcast activity (id. §§ 301-99), there was no express provision which covered the
new CATV business. In 1966 the FCC held that all forms of CATV could be
regulated by the Commission under the Communications Act. Second Report & Order,
2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966). This determination was upheld in United States v. Southwest-
ern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). See notes 20 & 23 supra.
10 Communications Act 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
31 Id. "Communications by wire and radio" are defined in § 153 of the Act.
For the purposes of this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(a) "Wire communication" or "communication by wire" means the transmission of
writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds by aid of wire, cable, or other
like connection between the points of origin and reception of such transmission,
including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services (among other things,
the receipt, forwarding, and delivery of communications) incidental to such transmis-
sion.
(b) "Radio communication" or "communication by radio" means the transmission by
radio of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds, including all in-
strumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services (among other things, the receipt,
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:158
Even when the FCC has extended its jurisdiction,3 2 such extensions
have been predicated upon the transmission and communication
activities in the newly regulated area. 3 Despite the broad language
adopted by the Commission and the courts, it appears that absent the
element of transmission or communication, the FCC has nojurisdic-
tion to control the construction of buildings which create interference
with television transmission and reception.3 4
forwarding, and delivery of communications) incidental to such transmission.
Id. § 153 (emphasis added).
Even when the FCC has issued cease and desist orders against noncommunication sources
of interference, such power has been exercised on the basis of the transmission aspect of the
interference source. For example, in Kentown Speedway & Hobbies, 1 F.C.C.2d 889 (1965), a
cease and desist order pursuant to § 312(b) of the Act (47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1970)) was issued
against a toy car raceway shop. The operation of the toy cars was causing the emission of radio
signals which resulted in harmful interference in the surrounding residential community. The
cars were found to be an "incidental radiation device" within the meaning of§ 15.31 of the FCC
rules (47 C.F.R. § 15.31 (1972)).
32 See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); note 20supra.
33 The question before the court in Southwestern was not whether the Communications Act
applied to noncommunication activity but whether a form of communication not specifically
covered by the Act was within FCC jurisdiction. 392 U.S. at 168. The Court and the parties
recognized that the activity involved in CATV was within the term "communications by wire and
radio." Id.
The most recent case involving FCC jurisdiction also recognized that radio transmission
activity is a necessary prerequisite to Commission jurisdiction. In United States v. Midwest
Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972), the Court stated:
The devotion of CATV systems to broadcast transmission-together with the inter-
dependencies between that service and cablecasts, and the necessity for unified
regulation-plainly suffices to bring cablecasts within the Commission's § 2(a)jurisdic-
tion.
Id. at 663 n.21.
The Court in Midwest Video emphasized the transmission requirement as a necessity for
FCC jurisdiction by concluding that Southwestern "expressly held that CATV systems are not
merely receivers, but transmitters of interstate communication subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction under that Act." Id. at 664 n.22.
31 Sections 301 and 303(0 of the Communications Act (47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303(f) (1970)),
which give the Commission power to prevent interference with transmission, are tied to
communication sources. These sections expressly empower the FCC to prevent interference
between broadcast sources and other signal-emitting devices, but give no authority to the
Commission to regulate interference from nonsignal producing sources.
Section 301 states:
No person shall use or operate any apparatus for the transmission of energy or
communications or signals by radio (a) from one place in any Territory or possession of
the United States or in the District of Columbia to another place in the same Territory,
possession, or District; or (b) from any State, Territory, or possession of the United
States, or from the District of Columbia to any other State, Territory, or possession of
the United States; or (c) from any place in any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States, or in the District of Columbia, to any place in any foreign country or to
any vessel; or (d) within any State when the effects of such use extend beyond the
borders of said State, or when interference is caused by such use or operation with the
transmission of such energy, communications, or signals from within said State to any
place beyond its borders, or from any place beyond its borders to any place within said
State, or with the transmission or reception of such energy, communications, or signals
from and/or to places beyond the borders of said State . . . except under and in
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These limitations on the Commission's jurisdiction are unlikely
* to be relaxed. The FCC has traditionally been unwilling to expand its
jurisdiction on its own initiative to areas not directly within the com-
munications field. Congressional approval was sought and obtained
before the Commission exercised jurisdiction over such noncom-
munication devices as are presently covered in section 302(a) of the
Communications Act.35
The FCC also felt it necessary to obtain congressional approval
by amendment to the Communications Act before the Commission
required that televisions have a UHF capability. 36 This approval was
sought despite evidence showing that the lack of this capability had a
substantial impact on television communication.3 7 It appears, there-
fore, that without legislative expansion of FCC jurisdiction, the
Commission will not provide protection for broadcast signals when
the interference is caused by construction and not by some interfer-
ing transmission.
B. Zoning
The ICCB court, in refusing to extend FCC jurisdiction in the
Sears Tower controversy, implied that if the petitioners were to
accordance with this chapter and with a license in that behalf granted under the
provisions of this chapter.
Id. § 301.
Section 303(f) gives the Commission power to "[m]ake such regulations'not inconsistent
with law as it may deem necessary to prevent interference between stations ..." Id. § 303(0.
Section 302(a) of the Communications Act, which gives the Commission power to regulate
devices not in the communication field, is specifically limited-to those devices which emit signals
which might interfere with communications:
(a) The Commission may, consistent with the public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity, make reasonable regulations governing the interference potential of devices
which in their operation are capable of emitting radio frequency energy by radiation,
conduction, or other means in sufficient degree to cause harmful interference to radio
communications. Such regulations shallbe applicable to the manufacture, import, sale,
offer for sale, shipment, or use of such devices.
Id. § 302(a).
I Section 302(a) was added by Act ofJuly 5, 1968, Pub. L. 90-379,82 Stat. 290 (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1970)).
Jurisdiction had been exercised over the use of radio-emitting devices such as medical
diathermy equipment and industrial heating equipment pursuant to authority granted by § 301
of the Act (47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970)).See 47 C.F.R. §§ 18.1-.262 (1972). Before receiving authority
from Congress in § 302(a), the Commission did not attempt to control the manufacture and sale
of such devices.
" The Commission is to
[h]ave authority to require that apparatus designed to receive television pictures
broadcast simultaneously with sound be capable of adequately receiving all frequen-
cies allocated by the Commission to television broadcasting when such apparatus is
shipped in interstate commerce, or is imported from any foreign country into the
United States, for sale or resale to the public.
47 U.S.C. § 303(s) (1970).
3' Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcastingv. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 35 F.C.C.2d 237,239
n.2 (1972).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:158
obtain any relief, that relief should come from local authorities. 38
Unfortunately, no such local remedies are presently available. The
Sears Tower was built in compliance with local zoning regulations.39
Current height restrictions in zoning generally are tied to engineer-
ing and structural capabilities with little regard for the problems of
broadcast interference caused by such height.40
It is possible that municipalities might exercise their zoning
power to protect television signals. 41 Height restrictions could be
imposed as an exercise of the police power of the municipality, 42
although this would raise serious constitutional problems. These
problems involve fifth amendment "taking" questions in an area
which Professor Daniel Mandelker calls "the borderline of police
power and eminent domain. '43 There is a fine line between what may
be done under the police power to promote the "general welfare,"
which requires no compensation, and a "taking" under eminent do-
main, which does require compensation. 44 Whether a height restric-
38 See notes 18 & 19supra. TheICCB court, quoting from Commissioner Lee's opinion in
World Trade (10 P. & F. RADIO REG. 2D 1769 (1967)), agreed that "it would be unwise for the
Federal Government to inject itself into this complicated local problem." 467 F.2d at 1401.
" This must be assumed in light of the fact that the builder was issued a building permit
and allowed to begin construction prior to any action by either viewers or broadcasters to limit
construction. It is also important to note that the viewers challenging the construction did not
raise any zoning issues. Had any violations been present the viewers would certainly have raised
them.
40 See, e.g., CITY PLANNING COMM'N, REZONING NEW YORK CITY 20-37 (1959) (discusses
"bulk regulations" governing height and floor area of buildings).
. " The National Institute of Municipal Law Officers has developed a model ordinance for
the control of radio interference. See 1 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS,
MODEL ORDINANCE SERVICE § 8-1201 to -1212 (1969). The proposed ordinance covers only
signal-producing interference devices, however, and does not recognize the problem caused by
blockage or reflection of signals.
" The city of San Francisco recently limited the height of new buildings to 40 feet in
approximately 90% of the downtown area. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 20, 1972, at
112. Presumably, this action was taken to protect aesthetic interests, but the principle would be
the same whether done to preserve the charm of the city or to protect broadcast signals. But see
note 45 and accompanying text infra.
4 D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 501 (1963).
" Id. The Supreme Court has been hesitant to establish strict criteria for determining
whether a governmental action constitutes a taking or is merely an exercise of its police powers.
"There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins." Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,594 (1962). The question in each case turns upon the reasonableness
of the regulation which is a fact question. In Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894), for
example, the Court stated:
To justify the State in ... interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public.., require such interference; and, second,
that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In order to determine the reasonableness of the ordinance the court must inquire into "the
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tion imposed to protect broadcast signals would be upheld as a valid
exercise of police power in the face of the fifth amendment is, at
present, uncertain.4 5
In addition to imposing height restrictions, municipalities might
also require that arrangements be made before construction is begun
for alleviating interference which might occur as a result of new
construction. Existing zoning laws might be amended to require that
translator stations46 be installed in the building to minimize the effect
of blockage and that certain other engineering changes be made to
minimize reflection. 47 Any such requirements have technical limita-
tions, however, since the protective measures could not be completely
effective in eliminating interference. 48 Moreover, it is doubtful that
such measures would be adopted on a local level without some prod-
ding from higher governmental authorities since it can be safely
nature of the menace against which it will protect, the availability and effectiveness of other less
drastic protective steps, and the loss which appellants will suffer from the imposition of the
ordinance." Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra at 595.
1- It is questionable whether protection of television signals is a promotion of the general
welfare. Protection of the general welfare is promotion of the safety or health of the general
population. See, e.g., Vernon Park Realty v. Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493,498, 121 N.E.2d 517,
519 (1954). It is unlikely that protection of television signals could be found to have an effect on
the health or safety of the general public. On the other hand, zoning restrictions designed to
protect esthetic values have been upheld. Esthetic considerations alone will suffice to sustain a
zoning ordinance if the "esthetic considerations ... bear substantially on the economic, social,
and cultural patterns of a community or district." Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263,272,225
N.E.2d 749, 755, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22, 30 (1967); see People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 466, 191
N.E.2d 272, 276, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 738 (1963). By analogizing to esthetic zoning it is arguable
that height restrictions designed to protect television signals would be within the police power of
a municipality.
46 The FCC has defined translator stations as follows:
(a) Television broadcast translator station. A station in the broadcasting service operated
for the purpose of retransmitting signals of a television broadcast station, another
television broadcast translator station, or a television translator relay station, by means
of direct frequency conversion and amplification of the incoming signals without
significantly altering any characteristic of the incomingsignal other than its frequency
and amplitude, forthe purpose of providingtelevision reception to the general public.
47 C.F.R. § 74.701(a) (1972).
If installed on an interfering building the translator would pick up and rebroadcast the
affected television signals. Viewers would be able to receive the same programs but on a
different channel. Such action would require FCC approval since the channel change might
create interference problems with other stations.
17 The utilization of a material known as AVRAM on the exterior surface of the building
has been shown to be effective in reducing the ghosting problem caused by reflecting signals.
The material is more absorbent than glass, steel, or aluminum. See Second Report on Sears
Building, supra note 12, at 6. The installation of "towel rail" window frame tuning devices has
also been effective in reducing the reflection of the relatively low-frequency waves of the lower
numbered channels. Id.
48 Id. Attachment 2. The imposition of such requirements would also impose a heavy
financial burden on the builder. See note 59 infra.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:158
assumed that the interest of protecting television signals would be
considered less important than the interest of encouraging
construction.
49
Finally, local zoning might prove inadequate even if im-
plemented because broadcast signals are not confined within the
boundaries of any one municipality. 50 Persons outside the municipal-
ity who suffered significant interference would have no voice in the
municipal zoning decisions that might affect their reception.
C. Nuisance
Nuisance actions by viewers are also inadequate to provide relief.
Because there has never been a well articulated right to receive a clear
signal, 51 interference with a legal right, which is necessary to consti-
" "[T]he prospects are that in most cities economics will prevail over other considerations,
and that the boom in skyscrapers will keep on booming for some time to come." NEWSWEEK,
October 16, 1972, at 104; see note 7 supra.
50 The viewers affected by the Sears Tower induded residents of the city of Chicago and
outlying suburban areas. BUsINEss WEEK, Aug. 12, 1972, at 92. The World Trade Center
affected television reception in New Jersey and Connecticut as well as metropolitan New York.
Statement of Frank Gregg Kear, supra note 1, Exhibits XB, XI.
5' It is generally recognized that recovery will not be allowed for loss of light and air, a
situation closely analogous to the television reception problem.See Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v.
Forty-five Twenty-five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1959).
In addition, the first amendment right to receive information is not applicable in this
context. In C.J. Community Servs., Inc. v. FCC, 246 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957), the court held
that the FCC had discretion to withhold a cease and desist order against the operators of an
unlicensed television booster station which served a community isolated by mountains. The
court's decision, however, was not based on any affirmative rightby the viewers to receive or the
broadcaster to transmit information. As stated by the FCC examiner and quoted by the court:
In this remotely situated and mountain-isolated community a public importance
attaches to the people's being informed and entertained through the television
medium; of course, there exists no vested right in either those who receive or thwse who transmit,
to a continuation of the operation; the contrary is here declared.
Id. at 662 (emphasis added).
The lack of a right to receive or transmit an interference-free signal must be distinguished
from an affirmative right to receive and transmit broadcasts free from state interference. First
amendment guarantees include the protection of communication by motion picture, radio, and
television. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (motion picture); Superior Films, Inc. v.
Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954) (motion pictures); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952) (motion picture); Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952)
(radio); Rumely v. United States, 197 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (books and pamphlets);
American Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd on other
grounds, 347 U.S. 284 (1954) (radio and television); Wrather-Alvarez Broadcasting, Inc. v.
Hewicker, 147 Cal. App. 2d 509,305 P.2d 236 (1957) (television). The right to receive informa-
tion is encompassed in the first amendment freedom of speech and the press. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505-08 (1946);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). These freedoms are protected from
state abridgement. Positive state denial of a source of television has been held unconstitutional
in Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 411 P.2d 289 (1966). In Weaver, an
initiative adopted by California voters banning home subscription television within the state was
1973] RECENT DEVELOPMENT 169
tute a nuisance, could not be claimed.52 Certainly, there would be no
right to receive or broadcast television signals superior to the right of
a landowner to use his land and the airspace above it to the fullest
extent possible.53 Absent a valid ordinance restricting use, a property
held by the California Supreme Court to be violative of the first amendment right to receive
information. Weaver, however, is clearly distinguishable from a case involving interference with
television signals. Although there is a right to receive information, induding information
distributed by television, free from state interference, there is no right to receive a good
television signal. See PeopleexreL Hoogasian v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 52 Ill.2d 301,287 N.E.2d
677 (1972); note 52 infra.
Perhaps it is time to enunciate a right to receive television signals free from all
unnecessary interference. Such a right is particularly compelling in light of the tremendous
importance television has assumed as an information medium and, therefore, as a factor in the
political process.
The strong influence of television on the attitudes of the average American cannot be
doubted. Television has been called the "most powerful social force in the world's most
powerful nation." R. BARRETT, SURVEY OF BROADCAST JOURNALISM 1968-69, at 3 (1969); see
Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67, 154 (1967). Television viewing
has increased dramatically: "Since the end of World War II the average daily exposure of
Americans to television has soared to six hours." Comment, We Pick'em, You Watch'em: First
Amendment Rights of Television Viewers, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 826, 827 (1970).
The importance and influence of television has risen as the time spent watching has
increased. A survey conducted between 1959 and 1967 indicates the degree of reliance-that is
placed upon television as a source of news and information and the rate of increase of this
reliance. The survey asked this question: "If you got conflicting reports of the same news story
from radio, television, the magazines and the newspapers, which of the four versions would you
be most inclined to believe-the one on radio or television or magazines or newspapers?" The
response was as follows:
1959 1961 1963 1964 1967
Most believable % % % % %
Television 29 39 36 41 41
Newspapers 32 24 24 23 24
Magazines 10 10 10 10 8
Radio 12 12 12 8 7
Don't know or
no answer 17 17 18 18 20
B. ROPER, EMERGING PROFILES OF TELEVISION AND OTHER MASS MEDIA: PUBLIC ATTITUDES
1959-1967, at 11 (1967).
52 Attempts to stop the construction of the Sears Tower through nuisance actions have
been unsuccessful in the Illinois courts. People ex rel. Hoogasian v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 52 Ill.
2d 301, 287 N.E.2d 677 (1972). The Illinois Supreme Court inHoogasian upheld a lower court
ruling dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Relying on the analogy to
light and air situations and Richmond Bros. v. Hagemann, - Mass. -, 268 N.E.2d 680 (1971)
(see notes 53 & 66 infra), theHoogasian court held that "absent legislation to contrary, defendant
has a proprietary right to construct a building to its desired height and that completion of the
project would not constitute a nuisance under the circumstances of this case." People ex rel.
Hoogasian v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra at 307, 287 N.E.2d at 679.
53 In Richmond Bros. v. Hagemann,-Mass.-, 268 N.E.2d 680 (1971), the operator of a
radio station sought an injunction to prohibit the construction of a building upon the
defendant's neighboring property. It was undisputed that the proposed building would re-
radiate the radio signals transmitted from plaintiff's towers causing significant distortion of
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owner's rights extend to a height above his land that can reasonably be
used.54 This is true even though the building may destroy a
neighbor's use of his land.55 Thus, any private or public nuisance
action by viewers must necessarily fail.
The balancing test employed in adjudicating nuisance actions56
would favor the builder in any action by viewers attempting to alter or
stop construction.57 Damage to viewers, if any could be established,
those signals. The court, however, refused to grant the injunction, stating that the radio station,
"by its incidental use of the space above the adjacent premises, could [not] condemn those
premises to a servitude."Id. at 682; cf. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 324 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir.
1963) (recognition that existing transmission facilities not entitled to complete protection from
interference even if interference caused by competing broadcaster).
The FCC also recognizes that interference is a fact of life in the broadcasting industry and
seeks merely to minimize rather than eliminate it. See Communications Act 47 U.S.C. §§ 302(a),
303 (1970), quoted in note 34supra; 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.610, 73.685(b) (1972).
54 [I]t is obvious that if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must
have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.
Otherwise buildings could not be erected, trees could not be planted, and even fences
could not be run. The principle is recognized when law gives a remedy in case
overhanging structures are erected on adjoining land. The landowner owns at least as
much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land.
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (emphasis added).See also Griggs v. Allegheny
County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Palisades Citizens Ass'n v. CAB, 420 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755,758 (9th Cir. 1936),cerL denied, 300 U.S. 655 (1937).
All of these cases concerned aircraft overflights, but the principle is equally applicable to
transmission of television signals over adjoining land since both situations involve a potential
encroachment upon the rights of landowners to use the airspace above their land. It would seem
clear that if, in the absence of a valid regulation, the courts are unwilling to recognize a right of
overflight superior to the landowner's rights, the courts would also be unwilling to grant a
superior right to a radio or television broadcaster.
55 In Capitol Airways, Inc. v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 215 Ind. 462,18 N.E.2d 776
(1939), an airport owner objected to the construction of the transmission towers upon adjacent
land as an obstruction to the airport and an interference with and destruction of the airport's
established business. A demurrer was sustained at the trial and affirmed on appeal, the court
saying:
The establishment of an airport upon the appellant's land in no way affected or limited
the right of adjacent landowners to use their land in any manner and for any purpose
for which they might have used it before. Had the appellee chosen to erect flagpoles,
factory chimneys, or tall buildings across the whole of its land, and several times as high
as its power line, it was within its rights notwithstanding it might have entirely pre-
vented the landing of airplanes at appellant's airport.
Id. at 466, 18 N.E.2d at 778.
56 The balancing test requires that a court weigh the utility of the conduct of the defendant
against the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff.See IV-A AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 28.26 (A.
J. Casner ed. 1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 822, commenta at
67 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 827, 828 (1939).
57 The advantage to the builder would be greater ifhe had already started construction. "If
the plaintiff had filed his bill before the mill was built, the balance of convenience would have
been different, and we should not have hesitated to stop what as yet remained only a project."
Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736, 738 (2d Cir. 1927). Whether or not the builder had
begun construction would make little practical difference in a nuisance action by viewers since
there exists no clear right to receive a television signal. See C.J. Community Servs., Inc. v. FCC,
246 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957); note 51 supra.
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would be inconsequential58 in comparison to the economic loss the
builder would incur if the building were ordered stopped or
significant alterations were required after construction had begun.5 9
It is reasonable to expect television interference in dense urban
areas, 60 and it is equally reasonable to expect tall buildings to be
erected there. If a building is constructed in accordance with local
zoning and building codes in an area where such buildings have been
erected in the past and can reasonably be expected to multiply in the
future, there would be no actionable nuisance even though the build-
ing interfered significantly with the reception of television signals in a
significant number of viewing households. 61
Similarly, a nuisance action by broadcasters in an attempt to
protect the transmission of signals would be equally ineffective. The
Communications Act states specifically that the broadcaster acquires
no vested rights in the broadcast signal merely by the acquisition of a
58 Viewers might claim a diminution in real estate values as a possible damage recoverable
in nuisance, but it would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish any cause and effect
relationship between the loss of good television reception and a decline in property values.
" Although Sears refused to limit the height of its building to a point which would not
cause interference, it did attempt to make alterations to the face of the building in an attempt to
reduce the amount of reflection. This voluntary action by Sears cost the company an additional
$5 million. See BUsINEsS WEEK, Aug. 12, 1972, at 92. No figures are available on the cost that
would have resulted had Sears been forced to alter its plans to avoid interference entirely. It
would certainly have been in excess of $5 million since additional land would have been
necessary to accommodate the lower structure with floorspace comparable to the Tower as
originally planned. Additional architectural, engineering, and construction fees would also
have been involved.
At most, the viewers would suffer a small diminution in their property values and would
have to bear the cost of readjusting their antennas if the transmission towers were relocated.
The problems involved in the antenna readjustment are discussed in Statement of Frank Gregg
Kear,supra note 1, § 4 (on file at the Cornell Law Review). See also Statement of Frank Gregg Kear
Before the FCC,July 24, 1967, at 18 (Dr. Kear estimates that readjustment of single antenna in
New York area would cost $69.90).
60 The patterns of construction employed before television became popular make the
avoidance of all interference impossible even if all new construction were to be limited in height.
Even before the World Trade Center was constructed in New York, serious interference
problems existed within the city.
Reception is generally poor in most of Manhattan below 110th Street because of the
varied building heights and the low angle of arrival. By far the mostserious problem is
the multipath degradation [ghosting] .... Since receivers high in tall buildings and
within about two miles from the transmitter are exposed to unusually high field
strengths, there are receiver and cable shielding inadequacies apparent in common
installation practice. Even the best installation work is often undone by echoes result-
ing from new building construction.
Peterson, Comparative Study of Low-VHF, High-VHF, and UHF Television Broadcasting in the New
York City Area, R.C.A. REVIEw 57, 74 (March 1963).
61 It makes no difference that the broadcaster's tower facilities were "first in time." See
People ex rel. Hoogasian v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 52 Ill. 2d 301,287 N.E.2d 677 (1972); note 52
supra; Richmond Bros. v. Hagemann, - Mass. -, 268 N.E.2d 680 (1971).
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license.2 The license granted by the FCC does not give the broadcas-
ter rights superior to those of an adjoining landowner,63 nor does the
issuance of the license depend upon the licensee's ability to provide an
interference-free signal. 64 In addition, the mere fact that there is no
legal right to transmit free from all interference 65 would be sufficient
to deny relief to the broadcaster.
Although the broadcaster would frame his complaint in terms of
a nuisance action against the builder, the proximate cause of the
alleged nuisance would be the transmission of radio signals over the
62 It is the purpose of this chapter, among other things, to maintain the control ofthe
United States over all the chafinels of interstate and foreign radio transmission; and to
provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited
periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be
construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.
47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970) (emphasis added).
63 "WMEX has.., no right by virtue of its FCC license to interfere with the use to which the
adjoining owners may put their land." Richmond Bros. v. Hagemann, - Mass. -, -, 268
N.E.2d 680, 682 (1971).
64 The FCC merely requires that the licensee make all reasonable attempts to avoid
interference. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.685 (1972) (sets minimum standards for antenna location
in order to minimize interference). See also id. § 73.610 (sets minimum distances between stations
on same channels in order to minimize interference between stations). Were a licensee charged
with the responsibility of providing an interference-free signal, he would be forced to acquire an
easement over all the land which his signal crossed. Clearly, this cannot be done since such an
easement would amount to a servitude over all adjoining land. See Richmond Bros. v.
Hagemann, - Mass. -, -, 268 N.E.2d 680,682 (1971). The nature of television signals makes
the establishment of an easement difficult to conceptualize. Unlike an aircraft following a
definite path at an ascertainable height, the electromagnetic waves used to transmit television
signals cannot be contained within any definite boundaries. The diffuse nature of the signals
makes the establishment of an easement in their favor unrealistic and impractical.
Although not directly in point, the aircraft overflight cases provide good examples of the
problems that would be raised were an easement established in favor of the broadcasters.
Since the arrival of the airplane as a convenient mode of travel there has been a
continuing controversy over who has primary use of airspace-the airline or the
property owner. It has been held that one owns "so much of the space above the
ground as [one] can occupy or make use of, in connection with the enjoyment of [his]
land." Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied,
300 U.S. 655.... It is true that Congress, by statute, has declared "exclusive national
sovereignty in the airspace of the United States . . ." 49 U.S.C. § 1508 (1964). ...
However, "[r]egardless of any congressional limitations, the land owner, as an incident
to his ownership, has a claim to the superadjacent airspace" to the extent that a
reasonable use of his land involves such space. Accordingly, an "invasion of the
'superadjacent airspace' will often 'affect the use of the surface land itself.' [United
States v. Causby] 328 U.S. at 265. . ." Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89 ...
(1962). Moreover, where that invasion is destructive of the landowner's right to possess
and use his land, it is compensable either through private tort actions or under the fifth
amendment where the use, by the government, amounts to a "taking". See United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 ... (1946) and Griggs v. Allegheny County,supra.
Palisades Citizens Ass'n v. CAB, 420 F.2d 188, 191-92 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Clearly it would be too costly to "buy" an easement over all the land in the long and wide
path of the transmission signal.
6S See note 51 supra.
1973] RECENT DEVELOPMENT
defendant's land by the broadcaster himself.6 6 A building which
interfered with the broadcast signal would not be responsible for the
consequences of its involvement 67 since "responsibility... for inade-
quate television reception ... rests more with the broadcaster's choice
of location than with the height of defendant's building. 68
CONCLUSION
A conditional right to receive and broadcast television signals
without unnecessary electrical or radio interference can be implied
from the Communications Act. 69 It is clear from the Act that Con-
gress at least intended broadcast signals to be protected from compet-
ing radio transmitters and from interference caused by noncom-
munication sources of radio emissions. 70 If the object is to protect
signals, there is little logic in basing FCCjurisdiction upon the nature
of the interference rather than upon its effect. If construction is
allowed to continue without a consideration of its effect upon televi-
sion reception and transmission, it is conceivable that large portions
of the urban viewing public will be permanently deprived of adequate
66 See Richmond Bros. v. Hagemann, - Mass. -, 268 N.E.2d 680 (1971); note 53 supra.
The Massachusetts SupremeJudicial Court held that the adjacent owner could erect a building
on his land as high as he desired. The court pointed out that the radio station emitted the radio
waves and thereby set up the activity or conditions which it claimed resulted in a nuisance. The
court, quoting from the Restatement of Torts, said that if injunctive relief were available in such a
situation a person,
"... by setting up an activity or a condition which results in the nuisance, could
condemn all the land in his vicinity to a servitude without paying any compensation,
and so could arrogate to himself a good deal of the value of the adjoining land."
[citation omitted]. By parity of reasoning, we do not believe that WMEX here, by its
incidental use of the space above the adjacent premises, could condemn those premises
to a servitude.
Id. at 682.
67 See Southern Ry. v. State, 130 Tenn. 261, 169 S.W. 1173 (1914):
[N]o one is civilly answerable for a nuisance, even though that nuisance be immediately
promoted by his own property, if this result is occasioned by the acts of others, over
whom he has no control, so affecting his property as to make it an agency contributing
to the nuisance. In other words, the proximate cause of every nuisance must be
ascertained in fixing liability therefor, and when one's property is, by the act of
independent third parties, made the instrumentality of a nuisance, such act of such
parties is the proximate cause, and the innocent owner of the property is not responsi-
ble.
Id. at 267, 169 S.W. at 1174.
6 People ex rel. Hoogasian v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 52 Ill. 2d 301, 305, 287 N.E.2d 677,
679 (1972).
69 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 301(d), 302(a), 303(f) (1970); 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.610-.685 (1972). These
sections give the FCC authority to protect signals against interference from an electrical source
whether or not involved in communications. The right is conditional because the FCC recog-
nizes that avoidance of all interference is impossible. See note 64 and accompanying textsupra.
" See 47 U.S.C. §§ 301(d), 302(a), 303(f) (1970); 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.610-.685 (1972).
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television reception. 71 Present interpretations of the statute, how-
ever, make the nature of the interference the critical element in
determining whether FCC jurisdiction can be obtained. 2 Thus, in
order to provide the protection required, a revision of the Communi-
cations Act will be necessary. Such a revision should make the effect of
the interference the critical element by discarding the restrictive
requirement that only interference from a signal-emitting source can
be controlled. This proposed legislation must balance the right of the
landowner to build upon his land with the equally important, but not
yet adequately recognized, rights of the broadcaster to transmit and
the viewer to receive television signals without unnecessary inter-
ference. Clearly, the rights of the broadcaster and viewer cannot
override completely those of the landowner. However, some legal
recognition must be given to the tremendous financial burden that
interference imposes upon the broadcaster. 73 Likewise, it should be
understood that substantial interference deprives viewers of a valu-
able source of information. 74
Broadcasters are charged with the responsibility of meeting the
"public interest" requirements of the Communications Act in order to
qualify for or renew a license.7 5 Since the license is but a three-year
grant of authority, a broadcaster must renew his license in order to
continue in operation. 76 This license renewal power should be used
by the FCC to force the broadcasters to keep abreast of technological
advances which might minimize the interference. The affected view-
ers can provide significant input into this renewal process by challeng-
ing the license renewal of those broadcasters who fail to make a
" The emerging CATV industry might obviate the problem. Cable reception, however,
requires the viewer to pay for the opportunity of receiving television signals that he previously
had received for free.
72 See Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 467 F.2d 1397 (7th Cir. 1972);
Investigation of Television Interference To Be Caused by Construction of the World Trade
Center by the Port of New York Authority, 10 P. & F. RADIO REG. 2D 1769 (1967); Kentown
Speedway & Hobbies, 1 F.C.C.2d 889 (1965).
" See note 59 supra. Dr. Kear has estimated the total cost of moving transmission facilities
from the John Hancock Building to the Sears Tower to be approximately $10 million. Only
seven years earlier, in 1965, the broadcasters had spent approximately $6 million to establish
these facilities atop the Hancock Building. Letter from Frank G. Kear to RobertJ. Pope, Nov.
30, 1972 (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
"' See note 51 supra.
75 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), 309(a) (1970); see FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470
(1940); Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964); McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir.
1956),cert. denied, 353 U.S. 918,rehearing denied, 353 U.S. 952 (1957); Huntington Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 192 F.2d 33 (1951); Colonial Broadcasters v. FCC, 105 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
76 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1970).
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substantial effort to alleviate the interference. 77 Viewers whose recep-
tion has been effectively destroyed by interference which the broad-
casters could have eliminated through available methods would have
a strong argument that the broadcasters had failed to meet their
public interest obligations.78 It has been held that a television station is
not only responsible for serving the city of license but is also charged
with meeting the needs of its entire area of service.79 Thus, suburban
viewers would not be denied the opportunity to challenge the licenses
of television stations assigned to urban areas.
While a license challenge by viewers would perhaps be successful,
it is a long-range remedy dependent upon technological advance-
ments. It would not alleviate the immediate problem of inadequate
television reception. Thus, the viewers are presently left with the
single alternative of organizing public pressure8" in an attempt to
77 Any party in interest may file with the Commission a petition to deny any applica-
tion .... The petition shall contain specific allegations of fact sufficient to show that
petitioner is a party in interest and that a grantof the application would be prima facie
inconsistent with subsection (a) of this section.
Id. § 309(d)(1).
Subsection (a) referred to above requires the Commission to determine "whether the public
interest, convenience, and necessity will be served by the granting of such application...I."Id. at
§ 301(a); see Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (representatives of Washingtons black
community allowed to challenge television station's license renewal application on grounds of
station's alleged unresponsiveness to black needs and interests); Office of Communication of
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (responsible representatives of
listening public have standing as "parties in interest" to appear before FCC to contest renewal of
broadcast license).
7 "[Ljosses in service are primafacie inconsistent with the public interest ..." West Mich.
Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 883,889 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Triangle Publications, Inc.
v. FCC, 291 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Hall v. FCC, 237 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
The fact that only a small number of viewers might be affected by the loss of service would
not be of great significance if these viewers were deprived of reception entirely. In Television
Corp. v. FCC, 294 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1961), an FCC decision allowing a relocation of the
broadcasting tower was reversed by the court because approximately 900 people would have
been deprived of all service and about 42,000 of all but one channel even though over 100,000
would have gained improved service. Denying that monetary considerations should be primary
in a decision concerning relocation of towers, the court said:
Television and radio are affected with the public interest: the Nation allows its air
waves to be used as a matter of privilege rather than of right. The enterprises which
today are profiting so handsomely from radio and television may in the end find it in
their own best interest to treat their businesses primarily as a public trust.
Id. at 733-34.
79 [I]t is clear that a broadcast licensee has an obligation to meet the needs and interests
of its entire area of service. This is particularly the case with respect to television
stations, in view of the limited number of stations. Suburban and other outlying areas
are not cities of license, although their needs and interests must be met by television
stations licensed to central cities.
Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 327-28 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
80 The attempts by Sears to minimize the interference by employing the materials dis-
cussed in note 47 supra and by making space available for the eventual transfer of the transmis-
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force both builders and broadcasters to make efforts to minimize.the
interference effects of the construction.8 '
Robert J. Pope
sion towers were not done under any legal obligation or compulsion. The solutions worked out
between Sears and the broadcasters probably resulted more from the public pressure generated
by irate viewers whose television reception was threatened than from any fear of legal action.
81 The necessity of reinforcing the top 45 stories of the Sears Tower in order to accommo-
date a transfer of the transmission towers has forced Sears to spend approximately $2 million
for steel plates to be placed at the corners of the building. BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 12, 1972, at 93.
A new antenna mast for the Sears Tower is estimated to cost $5 million, a cost which the
broadcasters must bear. Id.
